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Institutions	  and	  Populism	  in	  the	  Global	  South-­‐	  Lessons	  
for	  the	  Brexit-­‐Trump	  Era	  
By	  Noura	  Wahby	  	  	  After	   the	   2011	   Egyptian	   Revolution,	   the	   Muslim	   Brotherhood	   (M.B.)	   faction	   led	  demonstrations	  throughout	  the	  year	  chanting	  allegiance	  to	  the	  new	  military-­‐‑led	  roadmap	  and	  promising	  to	  take	  back	  control	  from	  Mubarak	  and	  his	  cronies	  (Eskandar,	  2013).	  They	  saw	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Mubarak	  regime	  as	  an	  opening	  into	  elite	  dominated	  state	  structures,	  and	  a	  chance	  at	   inclusion.	  Soon	  after,	   they	  won	  a	  parliamentary	  majority,	   secured	   the	  presidency,	   fashioned	  a	  new	  constitution,	  and	  were	  overthrown	   in	  2013	  by	  a	  military	  coup	  (Ibid.).	  The	  chance	  to	  penetrate	  the	  ruling	  establishment	  thus	  did	  not	  transpire.	  	  In	  2016,	  the	  U.K	  Independence	  Party	  (UKIP)	  embraced	  similar	  slogans	  throughout	  their	  campaign	   to	   leave	   the	   European	  Union.	   “Taking	   back	   control”	   became	   the	   tagline	   for	  groups	  disenfranchised	  by	  a	  ruling	  system	  that	  did	  not	  better	  their	  livelihoods	  (Barnett,	  2016).	  Since	  the	  referendum,	  the	  political	  establishment	  has	  yet	  to	  reach	  a	  Brexit	  plan	  that	   would	   support	   this	   envisioned	   British	   autonomy,	   without	   increasing	   economic	  hardships	  (Puglise,	  2017).	  	  	  	  The	  UK	  referendum	  emphasised	  the	  contribution	  of	  outlying	  provinces	  in	  determining	  the	   final	   outcome	   (Goodwin	   and	  Heath,	   2016);	  which	  was	   also	   the	   case	   following	   the	  Trump	  win,	  with	   tipping	  support	   from	  the	  Rust	  Belt	   states1	   (Florida,	  2016).	  Similarly,	  spatial	   analysis	   proved	   overwhelming	   support	   from	   poorer	   provinces	   that	   led	   to	   the	  2011	  win	  of	  the	  MB	  in	  Egyptian	  parliamentary	  elections	  (Eskandar,	  2013),	  as	  well	  as	  in	  Tunisia’s	  Constituent	  Assembly	  elections	  by	  the	  Islamist	  party-­‐‑	  Ennahda	  (ACPRS,	  2014).	  	  As	  such,	  strong	  contestation	  against	  the	  hegemony	  of	  the	  urban	  centre	  has	  long	  emerged	  in	   the	   Global	   South,	   with	   the	   latest	   ‘populist’	   backlash	   in	   the	   North	   following	   suit	   to	  express	  anti-­‐‑establishment	  sentiment	  (Ridley,	  2016).	  These	  are	  compounded	  by	  global	  experiences	   of	   urban-­‐‑rural	   inequalities,	   desolation	   of	   industrial	   cities,	   and	   the	  exploitation	  of	  state	   failures	  by	  non-­‐‑state	  actors	  bearing	  nationalistic	  and/or	  religious	  divisive	  discourses	  (Roy,	  2009;	  Ben	  Nefissa,	  2009).	  	  	  This	   essay	   thus	   argues	   that	   the	   recent	   voter	  backlash,	   rise	   in	  populist	   affiliations	   and	  imaginaries	   of	   exclusions	   can	   be	   understood	   alongside	   conceptions	   emerging	   from	  experiences	  in	  the	  South.	  It	  appears	  that	  the	  failure	  of	  institutions	  has	  provided	  the	  fertile	  ground	  for	  support	  of	  populist	  movements.	  Experiences	   from	  the	  Global	  South	  will	  be	  discussed	  to	  support	  this	  viewpoint,	  namely	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  social	  contract,	  networks	  of	  urban	  informality	  and	  elite	  privilege,	  and	  exclusionary	  populist	  movements.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  term	  Rust	  Belt	  is	  given	  to	  states	  around	  the	  Great	  Lakes,	  Midwest	  and	  other	  North-­‐‑Eastern	  areas	  that	  traditionally	  formed	  the	  economy’s	  manufacturing	  core	  before	  its	  decline.	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Failure	  of	  the	  Social	  Contract	  One	   rationale	   put	   forth	   for	   grassroots	   support	   to	   oppositional	   movements	   is	   the	  breakdown	   in	   state-­‐‑sponsored	   services	   in	   provincial	   areas	   and	   the	   retreat	   of	   the	  developmental	  state2.	   In	   the	  middle	  of	   the	  20th	  century,	  after	  achieving	   independence,	  nationalist	   movements	   in	   the	   South	   grappled	   with	   securing	   universal	   prosperity	   to	  citizens	  now	  under	  their	  rule	  (Rogan,	  2010).	  Developmental	  states	  emerged	  across	  the	  South,	   valuing	   industrial	   advancement	   and	   production,	   providing	   universal	   education	  and	  healthcare,	  as	  well	  as	  guaranteeing	  different	  forms	  of	  labour	  (D.	  Davis,	  2004).	  	  	  These	  endeavours	  were	  short-­‐‑lived	  however,	  as	  ‘globalised’	  notions	  of	  connectivity	  and	  competitiveness	   prescribed	   certain	   types	   of	   productivity	   and	   industries.	   With	   the	  dominance	  of	  neo-­‐‑classical	  economics	  and	  the	  era	  of	   ‘Thatcherism’	  and	   ‘Regan-­‐‑omics’,	  neoliberalism	  took	  root	  across	  the	  global	  (Ridley,	  2016).	  This	  resulted	  in	  new	  standards	  of	   modernisation,	   including	   the	   affinity	   to	   urban	   cities,	   a	   finance	   economy,	   and	  decentralisation	  (Merrifield,	  2014).	  	  	  	  Consequently,	  countries	  of	  the	  Global	  South	  faced	  the	  dilemma	  in	  embracing	  modernity	  and	   also	   appeasing	   their	   populations	   with	   traditional	   service	   provision	   functions.	   As	  such,	   in	   many	   instances,	   revoking	   social	   entitlements	   was	   immediately	   met	   with	  resistance.	  This	  occurred	  in	  1970s	  Egypt	  against	  subsidy	  removal	  and	  in	  2008	  with	  bread	  riots	  (Abdelrahman,	  2015),	  as	  well	  as	  in	  Latin	  America	  during	  the	  1990s	  and	  early	  2000s	  against	  privatisation	  (Almeida,	  2007).	  	  	  	  The	   breakdown	   of	   state	   efficiency	   has	   led	   to	   an	   inevitable	   lack	   of	   services	   in	   most	  provinces	  of	  the	  Global	  South	  (Roy,	  2009).	  What	  remains	  underreported,	  however,	  is	  the	  role	  of	  non-­‐‑state	  actors	  as	  providers	  in	  light	  of	  this	  failure	  (Ben	  Nefissa,	  2009).	  In	  Egypt,	  for	  example	  the	  MB	  had	  long	  provided	  healthcare,	  education	  and	  food	  supplies	  both	  in	  urban	  slums	  and	  provincial	  villages	  (Abdelrahman,	  2015).	  They	  were	  able	  to	  bank	  this	  support	  when	  they	  launched	  their	  successful	  parliamentary	  and	  presidential	  campaigns	  after	  2011	  (Ibid.).	  	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  reactions	  to	  the	  decline	  of	  industrial	  institutions	  was	  different.	  The	  decline	   of	   traditional	   powerhouses	   coincided	   with	   increased	   technological	  advancements,	   privatisation	   of	   state-­‐‑owned	   enterprises,	   and	   outsourcing	   to	   countries	  with	   competitive	   cost	   structures	   and	   lax	   legislative	   regimes	   (Merrifield,	   2014).	   The	  desolation	  of	  the	  UK’s	  northern	  cities	  bears	  great	  resemblance	  to	  those	  of	  the	  US	  Rustic	  Belt,	   symbolised	  by	   the	  bankruptcy	  of	  Detroit	   in	  2013	   (Ridley,	  2016).	   Similarly,	   cities	  across	  Egypt	  dominated	  by	  state-­‐‑owned	  industries	  such	  as	  Mahalla	  El-­‐‑Kubra,	  came	  under	  new	  labour	  regimes.	  These	  created	  flexible	  contracting,	  removal	  of	  worker	  protection,	  and	  others	  strategies	  increasing	  labour	  precarity	  (Abdelrahman,	  2015).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  The	  developmental	  state	  is	  defined	  in	  the	  narrowest	  sense	  as	  a	  state	  that	  focuses	  on	  economic	  prosperity	  through	  pursuit	  of	  industrial	  policies.	  (D.	  Davis,	  2004)	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  No	  viable	  alternatives	  were	  given	  to	  these	  cities	  as	  a	  means	  to	  stay	  competitive	   in	  the	  global	  market,	  and	  the	  dispossessed	  were	   left	   to	   fend	  for	   themselves.	   It	  should	  not	  be	  surprising	   that	   an	   alternate	   nationalistic	   rhetoric	   thus	   found	   large	   footing	   in	   English	  Northern	  cities	  and	  Middle	  America,	  leading	  to	  a	  break	  with	  traditional	  labour	  loyalties	  (Burnett,	  2016).	  	  	  Ultimately,	   the	   breakdown	   of	   the	   original	   social	   contract	   between	   the	   state	   and	   its	  citizens	  has	  left	  many	  disillusioned	  by	  the	  ruling	  elite’s	  promises,	  and	  systems	  of	  survival	  gained	  more	  importance,	  as	  the	  following	  sections	  will	  discuss.	  	  
Paralegal	  Networks	  of	  Privilege	  and	  Survival	  In	  past	  decades,	  neoliberalism	  has	  created	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  wealth,	  coupled	  with	  great	  inequalities	  (Harvey,	  2004).	  	  In	  the	  Global	  South,	  the	  rise	  of	  industrialists	  in	  places	  like	  Egypt,	  India	  and	  the	  Asian	  Tigers,	  was	  the	  hallmark	  of	  the	  70s	  and	  80s	  (D.	  Davis,	  2004);	  while	  the	  90s	  technology	  boom	  brought	  in	  a	  new	  class	  of	  technology	  elites	  across	  global	  value	  chains	  (Sassen,	  2016).	  Recently,	   these	  have	  been	  swallowed	  by	  the	  sheer	  power	  and	  magnitude	  of	  the	  financial	  sector	  concentrated	  in	   ‘global	  cities’,	   including	  London,	  New	  York,	  Tokyo	  and	  Paris	  (Sassen,	  2001).	  	  	  With	  each	  new	  wave	  of	  shifting	  elite	  settlements	  came	  the	  consolidation	  of	  advantageous	  networks	  guaranteeing	  certain	  privileges	  in	  laws,	  governance	  schemes	  and	  imaginaries	  of	  citizenship	  (Roy,	  2009).	  The	  influence	  of	  these	  networks	  can	  be	  discerned	  from	  cases	  such	  as	  the	  institutional	  backing	  of	  the	  ‘The	  City’3	  in	  London,	  bailout	  packages	  offered	  to	  US	  banks	  after	  the	  financial	  crisis	  (Ridley,	  2016),	  and	  constitutions	  in	  the	  Global	  South	  protecting	  military	  economic	  establishments	  (Eskandar,	  2013).	  Institutions	  in	  the	  latter	  can	   in	   fact	   cater	   specifically	   to	   elite	   aspirations.	   For	   example,	   Indian	   courts	   uphold	  bourgeoisie	  environmental	  ideals	  by	  implementing	  laws	  driving	  the	  poor	  out	  of	  public	  spaces	  (Baviskar,	  2005);	  whilst	  in	  Egypt,	  state	  agencies	  under	  Mubarak	  approved	  sales	  of	  state-­‐‑owned	  land	  to	  businessmen	  at	  token	  prices	  (Abdelrahman,	  2015).	  	  Nonetheless,	  while	  these	  exclusive	  networks	  seemingly	  dominate	  political	  and	  economic	  structures,	   those	   left	   behind	  have	  used	  diverse	  mechanisms	   to	   extract	   advantages	   for	  their	  own	  survival.	  The	  informal	  sector	  in	  the	  Global	  South	  is	  described	  as	  the	  illustration	  of	  how	  communal	  networks	  can	  support	  jobs,	  housing,	  service	  provision,	  social	  welfare	  and	   others	   with	   minimal	   state	   interventions	   (Ben	   Nefissa,	   2009).	   While	   an	   informal	  sector	   in	   the	   North	   seemingly	   does	   not	   exist,	   but	   emerging	   research	   on	   the	   invisible	  spaces	   of	   estates,	   ghettos	   and	   banlieues	   could	   be	   the	   starting	   point	   for	   further	   study	  (Wacquant,	  2001).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  City	  of	  London	  is	  a	  special	  authority	  with	  London.	  It	  is	  known	  for	  the	  concentration	  of	  financial	  and	  business	  power	  located	  within	  its	  ‘square	  mile’;	  the	  equivalent	  of	  the	  New	  York’s	  Wall	  Street.
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  The	  strength	  of	  these	  networks	  has	  not	  been	  well	  researched	  in	  the	  South	  as	  well	  since	  they	  overtly	  erupt	  at	  certain	  moments	  and	  under	  certain	  conditions.	  It	  seems	  that	  these	  ‘non-­‐‑movements’,	   as	   Bayat	   calls	   them,	   play	   a	   major	   role	   in	   the	   continued	   resistance	  against	  the	  hegemony	  of	  the	  elite	  settlement	  (2013).	  	  Yet,	  in	  many	  cases,	  some	  of	  these	  parallel	  support	  systems	  were	  built	  on	  divisive	  rhetoric	  from	  the	  start.	  For	  example,	  in	  Egypt	  much	  of	  the	  MB’s	  social	  assistance	  is	  contingent	  on	  imposed	  cultural	  ideals	  (Ben	  Nefissa,	  2009);	  while	  in	  Latin	  America,	  organised	  crime	  groups	  and	  church	  movements	  insist	  on	  ‘taking	  care	  of	  their	  own’	  (Arias,	  2006).	  	  As	  such,	  the	  failure	  of	  traditional	   liberal	   institutions	  to	  advocate	  the	  aspirations	  of	  the	  marginalised	   has	   warranted	   a	   parallel	   rise	   of	   populist	   movements,	   which	   will	   be	  discussed	  in	  the	  following	  section.	  
The	  State	  and	  Populism	  As	  Western	  communities	  settled	   into	   the	  relative	  peace	   following	   the	  1960s	  New	  Left	  movements;	  various	  waves	  of	  populism	  in	  the	  last	  decades	  have	  greatly	  contributed	  to	  politics	  of	  the	  state	  and	  institution-­‐‑building	  in	  the	  South.	  	  	  In	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  region	  (MENA),	  nationalist	  movements	  were	  formed	  from	   the	   early	   19th	   century	   against	   the	   Ottoman	   Empire	   and	   continued	   into	   the	   20th	  century	  against	  colonial	  powers	  (Rogan,	  2010).	  As	  direct	  colonial	  rule	  was	  overturned,	  many	  of	  these	  movements	  used	  their	  popular	  support	  to	  secure	  their	  own	  positioning	  in	  spaces	   of	   power,	   such	   as	   Nasser	   in	   Egypt,	   and	   Gadhafi	   in	   Libya	   (Ibid.).	   They	   also	  attempted	   an	  overhaul	   of	   societal	   power	   relations	   through	   agrarian	   reforms,	   socialist	  welfare	   policies	   and	   the	   privileging	   of	   certain	   sectors	   of	   society,	   such	   as	   the	  military	  (Ibid.).	  	  Although	   the	   pursuit	   of	   neoliberal	   ideals	   has	   replaced	   socialist	   dreams,	   many	   of	   the	  original	   leaders	   or	   families	   remained	   in	   power	   up	   to	   the	   2011	   uprisings,	   like	   Libya,	  Tunisia,	   and	   Syria.	   These	   now	   represented	   the	   autocratic	   ruling	   class,	   siding	   with	  traditional	  elites,	  and	  the	  populist	  vacuum	  was	  filled	  by	  the	  promises	  of	  heaven,	  through	  different	   strands	   of	   Political	   Islam.	   As	   such,	   institutions	   were	   barricaded	   against	   the	  infiltration	   of	   factions,	   such	   as	   fraud	   cases	   during	   the	   2005	   Egyptian	   parliamentary	  elections	  against	  the	  Brotherhood,	  and	  other	  opposition	  parties	  (Abdelrahman,	  2015).	  	  	  In	   Latin	   America,	   however,	   recent	   populist	   rhetoric	   has	   been	   mostly	   co-­‐‑opted	   by	  candidates,	  turning	  state	  institutions	  into	  a	  type	  of	  mediator	  between	  the	  elites	  and	  the	  masses,	  where	  candidates	  right	  of	   the	  spectrum	  have	  come	  to	  power	  (The	  Economist,	  2016).	   Social	   welfare	   programs,	   such	   as	   La	   Bolsa	   Familia	   in	   Brazil,	   and	   promises	   of	  inclusion	   have	   gained	   an	   imaginary	   appeasement	   of	   the	   people;	   while	   the	   rise	   of	  Pentecostalism	  and	  entrenched	  organised	  crime	  welfare	  networks	  tell	  a	  different	  story	  about	  the	  mobilisation	  of	  the	  disenfranchised	  (Arias,	  2006;	  M.Davis,	  2004;).	  With	  Rio	  de	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Janeiro	   electing	   its	   first	   Pentecostal	   mayor	   (The	   Economist,	   2016),	   the	   state	   may	   be	  witnessing	  a	  challenge	  to	  its	  perceived	  role	  as	  mediator,	  and	  a	  confrontation	  against	  its	  alliance	  with	  elites	  may	  be	  forthcoming.	  	  The	  rise	  of	  seemingly	   latent	  movements	  seems	  to	  have	  also	  caught	  commentators	  off-­‐‑guard	  elsewhere.	  This	  includes	  the	  popularity	  of	  Bernie	  Sanders	  and	  Donald	  Trump	  in	  the	  US,	  left-­‐‑wing	  Podemos	  in	  Spain	  and	  the	  Italian	  Five	  Star	  Movement	  (Desideri,	  2016);	  as	  well	   as	   right-­‐‑wing	   factions	   across	   Europe.	   Yet,	   despite	   these	   ascents,	   bureaucratic	  institutions	  and	  the	  political	  settlement	  have	  not	  allowed	  for	  an	  actual	  destabilising	  of	  the	  establishment.	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  US,	  despite	  Trump’s	  Muslim	  ban	  decrees,	  courts	  halted	  their	   implementation	   by	   using	   legislative	   caveats	   (Farrer,	   2017).	   Similarly,	   Syriza	   in	  Greece	  could	  not	  deliver	  on	  its	  promises	  of	  radical	  political	  and	  economic	  restructuring,	  as	  it	  faced	  backlash	  from	  its	  creditors	  and	  new	  austerity	  measures	  (Grollios,	  2016).	  	  	  Hence,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  further	  study	  the	  roots	  of	  state-­‐‑	  building	  and	  the	  constellations	  of	  power	  in	  society	  in	  order	  to	  fully	  understand	  how	  institutions	  can	  support	  or	  impede	  the	  rise	  of	  populist	  undertakings.	  
Conclusion	  Finally,	   this	  essay	   is	   intended	  to	  be	  a	  starting	  point	   to	  bring	   together	  cases	   from	  both	  hemispheres,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  look	  at	  the	  rise	  of	  populist	  movements	  across	  the	  globe.	  There	  seems	  to	  be	  many	  overlaps	  between	  the	  adverse	  mentality	  of	  a	  “Yes,	  Minister”4	  civil	  servant	   against	   European	   hegemony	   and	   a	   MB	   member’s	   unrelenting	   belief	   in	   a	  theocracy.	  Yet,	  the	  case	  of	  Tunisia	  differs,	  where	  initial	  populist	  support	  for	  the	  Islamist	  forces	   diminished	   following	   representative	   elections	   and	   an	   entrenched	   checks	   and	  balances	  system	  (Filalil-­‐‑Ansary,	  2016).	  Perhaps	  the	  initial	  comparative	  approach	  used	  in	  this	  essay	  could	  provide	  important	  insights	  for	  the	  multitude	  of	  countries	  now	  grasping	  at	  a	  societal	  compromise.	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